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At any time, the loss or damage to a naval aircraft is
a most serious matter with severe impact on dwindling
resources, this problem is greatly magnified. Much effort
has been devoted to the improvement of aircraft hardware in
an effort to reduce the military accident rate and its con-
sequences. An insidious problem exists, however, that can
negate many of the advances that have been made in the
material areas - the problem of the human factors involvement
in aircraft mishaps.
In discussing this problem there may be a tendency to
become mired down by the semantics of the terms 'Human Error'
and 'Human Factors'. The former term usually denotes an
error of commission or of omission, including time-dependent
functions, and, in general, tends to exclude the problems
that arise when a function can not be performed (or can not
be performed in a correct or total manner) due to a secondary
cause such as location, interference, et cetera. For this
reason, all personnel involvement patterns are frequently
collated under the generic title of 'Human Factors ', even
though this term is sometimes reserved for the analysis of
the human endeavor. Rather than depend on detailed and
definitive definitions, this report will use the term 'Human
Factors' to denote all types of personnel actions.
The rising toll of Human Factors involvement in Naval
aviation mishaps clearly indicates that some action be taken
to reduce this trend. However, prior to undertaking seme
costly, and perhaps fruitless, programs, it is wise to
consider the entire arena of Human Factors in an effort to
determine the most cost effective plans of action. This
effectiveness must be measured not only in the dollar cost of
such research and the resultant improvement programs, but
must also include the negative utility of the continuation,
and possible growth, of the problem if no action is taken.
A simplified statement of the immediate problem,
therefore, may be made as follows:
"Are there specific areas of research into Human
Factors involvement in Naval aircraft mishaps
that indicate a positive pay-off in terms of
mishap reduction and/or amelioration?"
There are two general methods of approaching both the
problem and the potential solutions. The first of these
might be termed the "Band-Aid" approach wherein after-the-
fact fixes are applied following mishaps in an effort to
prevent the recurrence of the problems. For many years this
technique has been espoused by the Navy (and the other
services) and, despite many drawbacks, has enjoyed a fair
degree of success. The establishment of the Naval Aviation
Safety Center in the early 1950 's was for the purpose of
reducing an extremely high aircraft accident rate through
the means of education and product improvement recommendations.
Although it might be argued that at least some of the dramatic
reduction in the aircraft accident rate has been due to modi-
fication of the scorekeeping techniques, it can not be denied
that not only has the accident rate been reduced but also
there has been an improvement in the mission effectiveness
of Naval aviation due to the reduction of lost and damaged
aircraft. From the Human Factors standpoint, however, many
of the product improvement programs involved the fitting of
the man to the machine, rather than the other way around.
In the mid-1960 's, the military undertook several
programs under the name of the System Safety, wherein defi-
nitive actions were required to design safety into the
weapon systems. These programs, which are currently codified
under the Military Standard 882A, "System Safety Program
Requirements", a document providing for the inclusions of
System Safety practices into the entire life cycle of weapon
systems. Although MIL STD 882A requires hazard identifica-
tion, hazard analyses, risk assessment and elimination or
control of high critically risks, this standard provides
minimal guidance in the Human Factors arena.
Specific requirements relating to Human Factors are to
be found in MIL STD 1472, "Human Engineering Design Criteria
for Military Systems, hquipment and Facilities", and the
Specification, MIL-H-4685B, "Human Engineering Requirements
for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities". These docu-
ments are required to be applied during development and
acquisition of military systems, equipment and facilities
to achieve the effective integration of personnel into the
design of the system. An engineering effort is required in
order to provide the development or improvement of the crew-
equipment/software interface and to achieve the required
effectiveness of human performance during system operation/
maintenance/control
.
In all design or re-design functions, the essence of
safety integration is hazard analysis, and in all types of
hazard analyses, the first step is applying the lessons
learned from previous systems. This requires that some type
of data bank be available, that this data bank be as complete
in the areas of the search as possible, and that complete in-
vestigation and evaluation of this data bank is performed. In
the arena of Human Factors involvement in Naval aviation
mishaps, this data bank consists, almost exclusively, of
information reported under the Navy's OPNAV Instruction 37 50.6
series under the auspices of the Naval Safety Center. For
this information to be effective in hazard analyses, it is
necessary for these data to be: (a) reported properly;
(b) evaluated thoroughly; (c) 'coded' into machine language
for storage in such a manner that all variations and perturba-
tions may be extracted from storage; and (d) capabel of
cross-correlation for the purposes of trend analysis.
The standard procedure for the development of a report
in accordance with the 3750.6 series of instructions is for
the mishap report to be generated by a local investigation
board with assistance, when available, from a Naval Flight
Surgeon, forwarded through the military chain command to the
Naval Safety Center, evaluated for Human Factors involvement
by the Aero-Medical Department, and inserted into the machine
records by coders with little or no training or background in
Human Factors. This procedure, although necessary due to
resource utilization, raises a question as to the complete-
ness of the data as they relate to Human Factors.
Another, and potentially even more serious, problem in
the development of Human Factors data lies in the fact that,
except for somewhat random submittal of material not normally
reportable under the 37 50 . 6 . series , e.g»? "Anymouse Reports",
there is little information available concerning those
problems that have not yet caused reportable mishaps.
Although a mishap is an undeniable proof of probability, it
is most ineffective from a resource utilization viewpoint.
One approach to the previously stated problem would be
to examine in considerable detail what has caused Human
Factors mishaps in the past, what current problems exist that
might cause problems in the immediate future, and how all
such problems may be prevented by proper aircraft design and/
or enhanced operator evaluation and education. However,
inasmuch as this report is for the purpose of recommending
specific research activities to alleviate Human Factors
involvement in Naval aviation, it has been decided by the
author to develop a matrix with a base of where such research
activity should be applied rather than using the type of
research as a base. A simplified statement of the Approach
to the Problem is, therefore:
"Recommend various areas of research that might best
be accomplished by: (a) In-house activity of the
Naval Medical Research Command; (b) In-house activity
of 'other Navy 1 ; and (c) contracted research
activities.
"
The following sections of this report are aligned along
the lines of this approach.
II. IN-HOUSE - NAVAL MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMAND
A. TASK 1.1
One of the very first steps to be taken in an effort to
define the problem should be an in-depth examination of
existing files and records. It is stipulated that the
aviation mishaps reported under the OPNAV 37 50.6 series have
had the advantage of immediate post-mishap investigation and
analysis and that additional examination of these records and
files at this time will suffer from the 'second-hand' nature
of the investigation. It is a fact, however, that the
original investigations rarely had the services of personnel
trained and educated specifically in the Human Factors arena,
such are to be found in the Naval Medical Research Command.
It is recommended that the following procedures be
established for this effort:
1. Request separate listings from the Naval Safety
Center of all aircraft mishaps for the past five (5) years
with (a) personnel as Primary causal factors and (b) per-
sonnel as Contributory causal factors.
2. For those mishaps listed with personnel as Primary
causal factor, make a representative (say, one in ten)
examination of the actual reports to verify the coded find-
ings. Based on the satisfcation with this partial survey,
make additional in-depth examinations, as desired.
3. For those mishap files with personnel listed as
Contributory causal factor, examine all of the actual records
to learn if training, man-machine interface and/or design
factors were present.
It is roughly estimated that the above examinations
would take approximately four (4) man-months effort on the
part of a human factors specialist including familiarization
with the coding and machine language that is in use. A major
portion of this time would have to be spent on-site at the
Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia because of the avail-
ability of the records.
The data obtained from these examinations should be
correlated into sub-causal factor arrangements, and, if
criticality can be determined, into a risk assessment order.
It is realized that, due to the low population of the
statistic, determination of probability will be difficult,
but a propbability based on the overal mishap record could
be used.
If these data are judged to be significant, it is recom-
mended that they be augmented by data from the Directorate
of Aerospace Safety (Air Force) and the Army Safety Center
to increase the size of the statistic. Because of the differ-
ences in aircraft types and mission employments, these data
may not be of special significance to the study. It is from
this reason that this examination should be conducted by a
trained Human Factors professional, rather than by a 'clerk'.
The short term goal of this research phase is to ascer-
tain what Human Factors elements have contributed to military
aviation mishaps in the immediate past. The long term goal
is, of course, the elimination or control of these types of
mishaps. To achieve this end it will be necessary to conduct
an analysis and evaluation of the various mishap prevention
techniques that may be available. These will include new
design, re-design, standardization of design and general
and/or specific operator training and education programs.
It is estimated that after the initial collection of
data, the remainder of this research task will involve
approximately two man-years of effort.
B. TASK 1.2
The most involved of the human operator functions in
military aviation is the task of the aircraft pilot.
Paradoxically, the single item that may be of the most
assistance to the pilot is the design of the cockpit/
instrumentation, while the single factor that may be of the
most detriment is also the cockpit/instrumentation design.
As the vehicles and their missions become more complex, so
does the cockpit environment.
The aircraft in the Navy inventory have had various
degrees of human factor engineering in the design of rhe
cockpit systems. In the most cases, however, this activity
has occurred early in the design cycle and has been con-
ducted by specialists in human factors with little input for
the operational community. In addition, many of the original
design stages, production and/or modifications because of
other considerations. There have been but very few instances
where a follow-up was made to ascertain if what is actually
incorporated in the cockpit system is optimal for routine and
emergency use. To use a management analogy, the initial
design was a result of Operations Research and the proposed
follow-up is Operations Analysis.
It is recommended that the following procedure be estab-
lished for this Task:
1. Establish a cockpit review committee consisting of
both human factors specialists and operational pilots.
2. Establish a cockpit system review procedure for both
routine and selected emergency procedures. This procedure
should include qualitative and quantitave reviews of res-
ponses, reactions and the time measurements of the responses.
3. Conduct these reviews in a current simulator or
Operational Flight Trainer (OFT) of a first line, high per-
formance aircraft. If resources permit this review to be
performed on more than one aircraft, it is recommended that
a fighter and a patrol aircraft be investigated. If only
one aircraft can be examined, it is recommended that it be a
fighter, with the suggestion that it be an F-18 because of
the great amount of human factors effort that was put into
this aircraft. This would permit a meaningful follow-up.
It is estimated that this procedure, after the estab-
lishment of the ground rules, would involve approximately
two-man years of effort.
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C. TASK 1.3
The fitting of the machine to the man is based on
average anthrometric data which, in some instances, is out
of date. The development of a cockpit system that accommo-
dates the 5 to 95 percentile pilot/crewman is based on
best available information, but one has only to look at high
school graduation photos, college and professional athletes,
and the increasing number of females in Navy cockpits to
realize that sizes have changed drastically over the
last ten to twenty years. As a result, the standardized
anthrometrical data needs to be re-examined.
It is therefore recommended that:
1. The standard anthrometrical data be examined in
relationship to the current averages to determine if changes
in the standard should be made.
2. The physical records of entries into the Navy flight
training program should provide an excellent source of
current data.
Review of the current data and correlation to the
anthrometric data would probably require approximately one-
half man-vear of effort.
1
1
III. IN-HOUSE - OTHER NAVY
A. TASK 2.1
The only ready source of potential human factor involve-
ment in aircraft mishaps is the after-the-fact mishaps
reported through the OPNAV 3750.6 series of instructions.
Many serious deficiencies go unreported because of the minor
nature of the mishap result, because of 'cover up 1 or because
the deficiency did not result in a mishap. One needs only to
attend a Happy Hour with fleet pilots to hear tales of occur-
rences that have never reached the publishing listings.
Although the Navy's "Anymouse" program was designed to
gather information about unreported events, these reports
only scratch the surface. It is possible to increase the
scope and depth of these reports by conducting a fleet wide
*
survey using questionnaires, it has been found that this
procedure is not as satisfactory as the interview format
called "Critical Incident Technique", as developed by Fitts
and Jones (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, circa 1947) and
Tarrant.
This technique may be summarized as follows:
1. A group of pilots is selected and informed of the
study and its objectives. They are permitted to withdraw
from participation if they so desire.
*W. E. Tarrants, "Utilizing the Critical Incident Technique
for Identifying Potential Accident Causes", (Washington, DC,
U. S. Department of Labor)
.
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2. The interview is conducted one-on-one by a trained
interviewer who presents the participant with a short list
of typical incidents to stimulate the recall process.
3. Participants are asked to describe any incidents
that they might recall, whether or not they had resulted in
mishaps. They are also asked whether they recall any such
incidents that occurred to theirs.
4. Questioning is continued until human errors or
unsafe conditions in any recalled incident can be described.
Recording of the information is by the interviewer.
One of the problems with the Critical Incident Technique
is that it requires a trained interviewer. The necessary
training, however, is not complex, and the Aviation Safety
Officer in a squadron or Wing staff could be trained.
A typical program was conducted at the Naval Postgrad-
uate School in March 197 6 as a Master of Science Thesis by
CDR Gene L. Daniels, USN, under the supervision of Professors
Waldeisen and Neil.
An opportunity to establish such a program and train
potential interviewers lies in the courses conducted by the
Aviation Safety Programs at the Naval Postgraduate School.
This activity conducts six-week short courses in flight safety
for squadron and staff safety officers and ten-day short
courses for command and senior staff personnel. The graduate
of the Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) courses go to or return
to fleet activities as flight safety officer. Not
only are these poeple well trained and motivated, they are
in fact, looking for safety projects to conduct upon their
return.
It is recommended that the following procedure be
established
:
1. Establish liaison with the Director, Aviation Safety
Programs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California for
permission to conduct interviewer training during the ASO
curriculum periods.
2. Develop the interview form and the interviewer
training syllabus.
3. Have the ASO conduct the Critical Incident Technique
interviews in his squadron upon his return.
4. Provide for correlation and review of the completed
forms
.
This program would require the part-time service of one
person, e.g., a Naval Postgraduate School faculty member, for
the training and report correlation. It is estimated that
this would require funding for from one-half to one Academic
Quarter for this faculty member for his services each year.
3. TASK 2.2
In addition to the Navy Medical Research activities,
there are several other centers of excellence in human
factors and the relationship of the operator to the aircraft.
These include the Naval Air Development Center (NADC) and the
Naval Air Test Center (NATO
. NADC has involvement in the
i d
aircraft during the design and engineering phases of the life
cycle, and NATC has the first look at new production aircraft
There has been little connection in the past between these
two groups
.
It is recommended that a specific charter be drawn up
that would marry the design expertise of NADC personnel to
the operational test and evaluation expertise of NATC. This
charter would direct a review (NaTC) and analysis (NADC) of
potential human factors problems in the test and evaluation
of new aircraft.
The scope of such a research program, and its cost,
would have to be the subject of negotiation between NADC,
NATC and NAMRL.
The payoff of this program would lie in the early, i.e.,
pre-fleet deployment, detection of the problem areas. In
addition, such a relationship between NADC and NATC would





All of the research tasks previously discussed have
been addressed in an attempt to correct problems. There
are several approaches looking at a definition of the
basic cause of human factor errors in an effort to solving
the causes rather than correcting their outcomes.
These activities are being conducted in industry,
research laboratories and in universities and many of these
programs need direct Navy support to enhance the probability
of success. This Navy support is not only in the form of
funding, which is always required, but also in the form of
making available data and facilities.
A prime example of this type of research is that being
conducted by Dr. Donald A. Norman, Center for Human Infor-
mation Processing, University of California - San Diego,
La Jolla, California 92093. Dr. Norman, who has been funded
by the Office of Naval Research, has been investigating the
basic causes of human error. He has done considerable
research with some definitive results into the causes of
repetitive errors among highly trained persons, e.g.,
typists. He has also done some investigation into causes
of pilot errors, but has been hampered by the lack of test
subjects. With the current, and proposed, funding support
by ONR, Dr. Norman does not require direct support at the
present, but if arrangements were made for him to gather
16
fleet data, say from simulator operations at near-by Naval
Air Station, Miramar, his work might have an immediate
payoff to the human factor mishap problem.
B. TASK 3.2
There are many other research activities that could use
varying amounts of support to direct or to continue their
activities as to human factor mishaps in Naval aviation.
Typical of these organizations is the following list gleaned
from a report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD!
report of the technical symposium "Problems of the Cockpit
Environment", (November 1968).
Calspan, Buffalo, NY
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC
Litton Systems, Guidance and Control Division,
Woodland Kills, CA
U. S. Army Natick Laboratories, Natick, MA
U. S. Air Force Aerospace Medical Research
Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH
Human Factors Research, Inc., Goleta, CA
While it is begging the premise of this report to
suggest that one looks elsewhere for research opportunities,
there are countless numbers of personnel who have involve-
ment in human factors research who are generally not known
until they are found. One source of these individuals
and oraanizations is through professional societies, such
as the Human Factors Society. Another source is through
trade journals and newsletters such as Aviation Week,
Aviation Daily, and the Federal Register.
It is also possible to gather names of researchers in
the field from publications of those who might already be
known. For example, in his report "Errors in Human
Performance" (Report No. 8008, Aug 80), Dr. Norman has three
pages of references and a distribution list of approximately
18 names/activities. (One copy was sent to Dr. Roger W.
Remmington, Code L52, NAMRL.)
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The following research actions have been recommended:
TASK
Review of existing mishap reports
Cockpit review/analysis of existing
Aircraft




Basic research into error causes
Broad research functions
To optimize the pay-off of these human factors research
























1. Commanding Officer 10
Naval Aerospace Medical Laboratory
Pensacola, FL 32508
2. Naval Postgraduate School 2
Library, Code 0142
Monterey, CA 9 3940
3. Research Administration 1
Code 012A
Naval Postgraduate School





5. CDR L. E. Waldeisen 5
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory
Michoud Station
New Orleans, LA 70189




Monterey, CA 9 394






DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY - RESEARCH REPORTS
II miii iiiiiiiiiiiii hi
5 6853 068010 1
UC\J
